Screenwriter William Goldman is famously quoted as saying of Hollywood, “nobody knows anything.” He didn’t mean that the town was filled with morons. What he meant was that with all of the experience, talent and expertise in the entertainment industry, still no one knows how to pick a winner. Why? It’s because chance, randomness and just plain unknowables play so huge a role in determining winners and losers that all this expertise matters little.
This is the first of three posts on the topic of “Nobody knows Anything.” Today we’ll talk about this crazy financial mess we’ve gotten ourselves into. Future posts will address entrepreneurship and politics in the context of unknowables.
The fact is nobody knows anything. No matter what you hear, or who you hear it from nobody knows anything. There are smart people out there in every field of expertise. Lots of them. They study the minutiae. They analyze the details. They theorize broadly. Their pronouncements carry an air of confidence and they sound both plausible and convincing. They have become masters at the illusion of certainty. They are not, for the most part, intentionally misleading.
This week, the failure of Bear Stearns further drove the point home. One of the world’s premier financial institutions saw all but a fraction of its value evaporate overnight. Here’s the thing: Bear Stearns did not lack expertise. They were packed wall to wall with some of the best and brightest from around the world. They weren’t even particularly greedy. But after crunching all the data, the experts at Bear Stearns chose to invest in exotic debt instruments to earn a return only slightly higher than average. They were certain it was safe. After all, these were some of the most revered financial minds in the world. Author Nassim Taleb would say that Bear Stearns was, “picking up pennies in front of a steamroller.” In the end they didn’t know anything, and it cost Bear Stearns nearly everything. In fact, were it not for the Fed stepping in with unprecedented steps, this one simple failure could have had a domino effect that would have seen US financial markets collapse.
Taleb (whose two books, Fooled by Randomness and The Black Swan I cannot recommend highly enough) writes eloquently of this cult of expertise. We simply don’t take into account how unpredictable, seemingly random events can have disproportionate impact. Sometimes these events produce catastrophic results (as in 9/11) and others change all of our lives for the better. Taleb’s views are summarized in this article.
The inherent complexity of today’s financial markets increases exposure to these random and seemingly unrelated events. And the highly leveraged and interconnected nature of world markets tends to magnify their impact. It seems bizarre that a few hundred thousand homeowners defaulting on loans could even conceivably throw the worldwide economy into a recession. The experts didn’t see this coming. In the end, they didn’t know anything.
As you listen to economic experts today you will hear the full range of prognostication. From dire predictions of a 1930’s style depression to a mere blip in the ever growing growth chart. How do we know who to believe? We don’t. We can’t. Some will be right in their forecasts and will be hailed as the best of the best. The ones who get it wrong will equivocate. At the end of the day, nobody knows.
Taleb tells the story of a foolproof method used by new brokers to build their practices. It’s instructive in context of the current times.
The new broker purchases a list of 8,000 names of prospective clients. To half of them he sends an introductory letter that confidently predicts that over the next quarter, the market will go up. To the other half, he confidently predicts that the market will go down. At the end of the quarter he will have been wrong for 4,000 of those potential clients. He throws those names away. Of the remaining 4,000 he again sends an up projection to half and a down projection to half. Once again focusing only on those prospects for whom he was right. After repeating this for one year, he is left with 500 people who are now convinced that they have found the next Warren Buffett. The point is that economic forecasting is done by those who have been lucky enough to have been right. There were at least as many who confidently projected incorrectly. It’s just that now they are managing departments at Best Buy instead of forecasting for Bear Stearns.
My personal belief is that while being optimistic may have no more basis in fact that being pessimistic, you sleep better and worry less. If the worst happens, we’ll all get through. But until then, I’m planning to enjoy the sleep of the ignorant.
If I have to believe one economist over another, I think I’ll choose Ben Stein, who admonishes us, “not to worry. We’ll all be living and spending like drunken sailors again real soon.”